We study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game is considered from the point of view of various criterions of optimality. We prove existence of ε-equilibrium situations and show that the ε-equilibrium strategies that we have found are ε-maxmin. Conditions under which the equilibrium plays are Pareto-optimal are given.
Introduction
The classical duel is a zero-sum game of two players of the following type. The players have certain resources and use them during a given time interval with the goal of achieving success. Use of the resource γ at the moment t leads to success with the probability depending on the amount of resource γ and the time t only (it is usually assumed that the probability of success increases with time). As soon as one player achieves the goal he receives his profit, which is equal to his opponent's loss, and the game ends. Various assumptions about the ways players use their resources and about players receiving information about the opponent's behavior during the game define various kinds of duels [1, 2] . Models were considered where players' resources were discrete (discrete firing duels), infinitely divisible (continuous firing duels), continuous for one of the players and discrete for the other one (mixed duels, or fighter-bomber duels) [5, 6] . Researchers studied noisy duels [3, 5, 7] , where every player at a given moment of time had complete information about his opponent's behavior up to that moment, and silent duels, where no such information was available. At present time duels are considered as classical models of competition [1, 8] . However, their application as such is somewhat limited by the assumption that the players' interests are strictly opposite to each other. Games of the duel type with nonzero sum belong to an unexplored class of infinite games with nonopposite interests.
A nonzero-sum game which is a generalization of the classical antagonistic duel was first considered in [9] ; it was a nonantagonistic noisy fighter-bomber duel. Then nonzero-sum duels were studed in [10] , [11] , [12] .
In this paper we study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel with discrete firing [3, 4] . This paper is an extended verion of [13] with complete proofs. It is also a sequel to [11] .
The author is grateful to Leonid Positselski for his help in translating this paper into English and editing it.
Preliminaries from Game Theory
A game of two players is a quadruple Γ = {X, Y, K 1 (x, y), K 2 (x, y)}, where X and Y are sets of the players' strategies and K j (x, y), j = 1, 2 are the players' payoff functions, which are defined on the Carthesian product X ×Y and determine the j-th player's payoff when Player I uses a strategy x ∈ X and Player II uses a strategy y ∈ Y . A game Γ is called a zero-sum game of two players, or an antagonistic game if K 1 (x, y) + K 2 (x, y) = 0 for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and a nonzero-sum game of two players, or a nonantagonistic game otherwise. The mixed extension of a game Γ is the game Γ = Φ, Ψ, K(ϕ, ψ) , where Φ and Ψ are the sets of distributions on X and Y and K j (ϕ, ψ) (j = 1, 2) are the mean values of the payoff functions K j (x, y) over the distributions ϕ ∈ Φ, ψ ∈ Ψ. Pure strategies of the game Γ are distributions concentrated in one point x ∈ X or y ∈ Y , respectively. All the other distributions ϕ ∈ Φ, ψ ∈ Ψ are called mixed strategies.
A situation (x, y) is a pair of the player's strategies. A situation (x e , y e ) is called an equilibrium situation if for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y the following inequalities hold:
The vector (v 1 , v 2 ), where v 1 = K 1 (x e , y e ) and v 2 = K 2 (x e , y e ), is called the equilibrium value corresponding to the equilibrium situation (x e , y e ), and a strategy included in some equilibrium situation is called an equilibrium strategy.
An infinite game with nonantagonistic interests may not admit an equilibrium situation. A situation (x ε , y ε ) is called an ε-equilibrium situation if for any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y the following inequalities hold:
A player's strategy included in some ε-equilibrium situation will be called an ε-equilibrium strategy. If the limits
exist, the vector (v 1 , v 2 ) will be called the equilibrium value corresponding to a set of ε-equilibrium situations {(x ε , y ε )}. A strategy x m ∈ X is called a maxmin strategy of Player I if the function m 1 (x) = inf y∈Y K 1 (x, y) attains its maximal value in it. Analogously, a strategy y m ∈ Y is called a maxmin strategy of Player II if the function m 2 (y) = inf x∈X K 2 (x, y) attains its maximal value in it. The vector w = (w 1 , w 2 ), where
is called the maxmin value of a nonzero-sum game. The value w j is the best guaranteed payoff of the j-th player.
In an infinite game maxmin strategies may not exist. In this case ε-maxmin strategies are considered. A strategy x ε m ∈ X is called an ε-maxmin strategy of Player I if
and w 1 is called the maxmin value of the game of Player I. Analogously one defines an ε-maxmin strategy of Player II: a strategy y ε m ∈ X is called an ε-maxmin strategy of Player II if
and w 2 is called the maxmin value of the game of Player II. If an antagonistic game admits equilibrium situations, then the equilibrium values corresponding to them coincide and are equal to the maxmin value. Equilibrium strategies of an antagonistic game are maxmin and they are called optimal, while ε-equilibrium values are ε-maxmin and they are called ε-optimal. A nonzero-sum game may admit equilibrium situations with unequal equilibrium values.
Let us introduce a partial order relation ≻ in R 2 :
where at least one of the inequalities is strict. Denote by S the set of all situations s = (x, y). The relation of Pareto preference on the set S is defined as follows. Let
A situation s p = (x p , y p ) is called Pareto-optimal if there are no situations s = (x, y) such that s ≻ s p . In an antagonistic game all the situations are Pareto-optimal. A game is called quasi-antagonistic, or a game with opposite interests, if all the situations of the game are Pareto-optimal, i. e., if for any two situations (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ S the following conditions hold:
3 Posing the problem
Consider a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel with discrete firing. The players compete in the conditions of complete information. They have discrete resources m, n ∈ N which they use during the time interval [0, 1] . The effectiveness of the j-th player using his resource is described by the function P j (t) (j = 1, 2), which defines the probability of achieving success when using the unit of resource at the moment t. The functions P j (t) are continuous and increasing, P j (0) = 0, P j (1) = 1, 0 < P j (t) < 1 for t ∈ (0, 1). If one of the players achieves success, the game stops. If a player has used all of his resource and hasn't achieved success, the other player postpones his action until the moment t = 1, when his probability of success is equal to one. The profit of the j-th player in the case of his success is equal to A j , and his loss in the case of his opponent's success is equal to B j , where
The players' profits are equal to 0 if no one of them achieved success or if the success was achieved by both of them simultaneously. A player's strategy is a function assigning the moment of next action to a pair of amounts of players' current resources. Let us call the described game a noisy nonzero-sum duel with discrete firing.
. . , m) the moments of time when Player I uses his resource. Analogously, denote by η i (0 η i η i−1 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n) the moments of time when Player II uses his resource. The vectors τ and η will be called the vectors of action moments of the players. The payoff function K j (τ, η) is the mathematical expectation of profit received by the j-th player in the case when the players use their resources at the moments of time τ i , η j (i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n). It is computed in the following way. If m = 0, n = 0, then B 2 ) and call A the profit vector and B the loss vector of the players. Introduce the vector-function of effectiveness P (t) = (P 1 (t), P 2 (t)). Let us denote the described game by Γ mn (P, A, B) or, for brevity, by Γ mn and its mixed extension by Γ mn (P, A, B) (or Γ mn ).
Suppose that in the duel Γ mn (P, A, B) the profit and loss vectors are related by the equation A 1 = B 2 , A 2 = B 1 , i. e., the profit of each player is equal to his opponents' loss. Then it follows from the relations (6), (7) that
, under these conditions the game is antagonistic.
Situations of ε-equilibrium
Lemma 1 (Fox, Kimeldorf [3] ). There exists a set {t ij i, j ∈ N} such that
and for all m, n ∈ N the following inequalities hold:
, where t 0n = t m0 = 1.
Choose ε > 0 and find δ j (j = 1, 2) such that
Take δ = min{δ 1 , δ 2 }. Let µ, ν be the current values of the players' resources and ϕ ε µν be the uniform distribution concentrated in the interval [t µν , t µν + δ]. Define the players' mixed strategies x ε , y ε in the following way. The strategy x ε (y ε ) prescribes to choose the next moment of action τ µ (η ν ) in the random way according to the distribution function ϕ 
is the corresponding equilibrium value.
Proof. The second equations in both lines of (11) hold by Lemma 1. Let us obtain recurrence relations for v mn . By (11) we have: 
Now obtain an expression for v 1 mn in terms of v 1 m,n−1 . By (11) we have:
. Hence we get:
Analogously we deduce recurrence relations for v 
To prove that (x ε , y ε ) are ε-equilibrium situations it is necessary and sufficient to verify the following relations:
Lemma 2. For any ε > 0 there exist such strategies x ε , y ε that for any pure strategies τ and η of Players I and II the following inequalities hold:
Proof. For n = 0 and arbitrary m > 0 by the definition of payoff function we have:
Analogously for m = 0 and arbitrary n > 0
By (11) we have:
In both cases the inequalities (20), (21) hold. For arbitrary m > 0, n > 0 we proceed by induction on the number of action moments of the players. Assume that Lemma is true for all pairs (µ, ν) for which µ m, ν n, (µ, ν) = (m, n) and prove it for (µ, ν) = (m, n).
Every pure strategy of Player I has the following structure. Let t ∈ [0, 1] denote the planned moment of his first action. If Player II acts and misses at a time η n < t, then Player I follows a pure strategy τ 1 in Γ m,n−1 . If Player II does not act before the time t then Player I acts at the time t, and unless Player II also acts at the time t, Player I after that adopts a pure strategy τ 2 in Γ m−1,n . Every pure strategy of Player II has the similar structure. Let u ∈ [0, 1] denote the planned moment of his first action. If Player I acts and misses at a time τ m < u, then Player II follows a pure strategy η 1 in Γ m−1,n . If Player I does not act before the time u then Player II acts at the time u, and unless Player I also acts at the time u, Player II after that adopts a pure strategy η 2 in Γ m,n−1 . The strategy y ε of Player II is constructed as follows. Fix ε > 0. Choose t randomly according to ϕ ε mn . If Player I does not act before the time t, then Player II acts at the time η n = t and, unless Player I also acts at the time t, then adopts the strategy y 1,ε in Γ m,n−1 . If Player I acts and misses at the time τ m < u, then Player II adopts the strategy y 2,ε in Γ m−1,n . Accoding to the inductive assumption, we choose y 1,ε , y 2,ε such that for any pure strategies τ 1 and τ 2 of Player I the following inequalities hold:
The strategy x ε of Player I is constructed similarly. Choose u randomly according to ϕ ε mn . If Player II does not act before the time u, then Player II acts at the time η n = u and, unless Player II also acts at the time u, adopts the strategy x 1,ε in Γ m−1,n . If Player II acts and misses at the time τ m < u, then Player I adopts the strategy x 2,ε in Γ m,n−1 . Accoding to the inductive assumption, we choose x 1,ε , x 2,ε such that for any pure strategies η 1 and η 2 of Player II the following inequalities hold:
For all strategies described above we have ignored the response to simultaneous actions of players since this event has probability 0 when Player I adopts x ε or Player II adopts y ε .
Let us prove the inequality (20).
Note that by the definition of payoff function for any strategies x, y we have:
Let τ be an arbitrary pure strategy of Player I and t be the time of first action in τ . There are three cases to be considered.
1. Suppose t ∈ [0, t mn ]. In this case Player I always acts first; so
One can see from the inequality (27) that the right hand side of (28) does not exceed
According to (23), the latter expression is less than
Using the recurrence relation (12) we get:
2. Suppose t ∈ (t mn , t mn + δ). In this case either player may act first; so
Estimate the first integrand using the relations (26), (22), and (13):
Estimate the second integrand using the relations (27), (26), (9), (10), and (12):
After integrating we get:
3. Suppose t ∈ [t mn + δ, 1]. In this case Player II always acts first; so
Estimate the integrand using the relations (26), (22), (13):
After integrating we have:
Hence the inequality (20) is proved. Now let us turn to the inequality (21). Let η be an arbitrary pure strategy of Player II and u = η n be the first action time in η.
There are three cases to be considered.
1. Suppose u ∈ [0, t mn ]. In this case Player II acts first; so
By the relations (26), (22), and (13), we have:
2. Suppose u ∈ (t mn , t mn + δ). In this case either player may act first; so
Estimate the first integrand using the relations (27), (25), and (12):
Estimate the second integrand using the relations (26), (27), (9) , (10) , and (13):
3. Suppose u ∈ [t mn + δ, 1]. In this case Player I acts first; so
By the relations (27), (22), and (12), we have:
Hence the inequality (21) is proved.
2
Let us continue to prove the theorem. Choose ε > 0. By Lemma 2, we can find a strategy y ε , satisfying (20) for any pure strategy τ of Player I.
From the inequality (20) it follows that
for any mixed strategy x of Player I. In particular for x = x ε we have:
From the inequality (21) it follows that
for any mixed strategy y of Player II. In particular for y = y ε we have:
Taking in account the relations (29), (32) we obtain
for any mixed strategy x of Player I. Hence inequality (16) Proof. Let us use the properties of the zero-sum duel Γ mn (P, C, C), where
In an antagonistic game the equilibrium value coincides with the maxmin value and ε-equilibrium strategies are ε-maxmin strategies. As the equilibrium value of Γ mn (P, C, C) is equal to v 1 mn [4] , so the maxmin value of this game is also equal to v 1 mn and the ε-equilibrium strategy x ε of Player I is his ε-maxmin strategy. Thus the maxmin value of the game Γ mn (P, A, B) for Player I is equal to v 1 mn , and x ε is his ε-maxmin strategy.
The statement of the theorem for Player II follows from the symmetry of the setting. 2
Pareto-optimal plays
The pair p = (τ, η) of vectors of action moments realized during the game is called a play. Let us denote the set of all plays of a noisy duel Γ mn (P, A, B) by P. Note that P is a subset of the set of all situations of the corresponding silent duel (with the same effectivess functions, resources, and vectors of profit and loss). Namely, P includes exactly those situations of the silent duel in which after one of the players has used all of his resource, the other one postpones his action until the moment t = 1. 
2 ) (j = 1, 2). A play p = (τ, η) ∈ P is called a T -play if for any k, l (1 k m; 1 l n) at least one of the following two equations holds
where k, l are the current resources of the players.
be an arbitrary T -play with noncoinciding action moments of the players, i. e., τ k = η l for all k (1 k m), l (1 l n). Then
Proof. Let us prove Lemma by induction on the number of action moments of the players. For n = 0, m > 0 or m = 0, n > 0 the assertion is true as v
Assume that the statement is true for all pairs (k, l) such that k m; l n; k + l < m + n and prove it for (k, l) = (m, n). Suppose that Player I acts at the moment t = t mn . Then using the recursive formula (6) for τ m < η n and the inductive assumptions we obtain
Suppose that Player II acts at the moment of time t mn . Then using the formula (6) for τ m > η n and the inductive assumptions we obtain
The second player's payoff fuction is considered in the analogous way.
2 ) ∈ P satisfy the conditions (1 − P 1 (τ i )) × × n j=2
(1 − P 2 (η j )) (A 1 P 1 (t 11 ) − B 1 (1 − P 1 (t 11 ))) ;
(1 − P 2 (η j )) (A 1 P 1 (t 11 ) (1 − P 2 (t 11 )) − B 1 (1 − P 1 (t 11 )) P 2 (t 11 )) .
Consider the difference K 1 (τ 1 , η 1 ) − K 1 (τ 2 , η 2 ). Taking in account that by Lemma 1 P 1 (t 11 ) + P 2 (t 11 ) = 1, we have:
2 ) = = (A 1 − B 1 )P 1 (t 11 )P 2 (t 11 ) m i=2
(1 − P 1 (τ i )) n j=2
(1 − P 2 (η j )) .
Analogously,
(1 − P 1 (τ i ))
n j=2
The statement of Lemma follows from (36), (37). 2
A duel may have one of four alternative results: H 0 -no one of players achieves success; H 1 -Player I achieves success; H 2 -Player II achieves success; H 3 -both players achieve success simultaneously. We denote the probability of the result H i in play (τ, η) by Q i (τ, η) (i = 0, 1, 2, 3). Then: 
Success of both players is possible only if they act simultaneously, because if one of the players achieves success, the game stops. As the payoff function K j (τ ; η) is the mathematical expectation of profit, so
By (38), we have: Denote by P ′ ⊂ P the set of plays with noncoinsiding action times in which τ 1 = 1 or η 1 = 1. The complement P \ P ′ includes plays in which the players use their last units of resource simultaneously.
Lemma 5. Let p ′ = (τ ′ , η ′ ) ∈ P ′ and p = (τ, η) ∈ P \ P ′ . In this case (1) 
